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JN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF U11AH 
CLACK-NOMAH FLYING CLUB, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- vs. -
STERLING AIRCRAFT, INC., 
Def end ant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10380 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action before the District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, by the plaintiff against 
the defendant for dc,mage to an aircraft owned by 
the plaintiff, such da.mage claimed by the plaintiff 
to have been caused by the negligence of the de-
fendant. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This matter came on regularly for trial before a 
jury, the Honorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., judge presid-
ing, on February 17, ! 8, 1965, the matter having been 
brought to issue by the filing of a Complaint by the 
plaintiff, the filing of an Answer by the defendant, 
and other and various pleadings. The plaintiff in-
troduced its evidence and rested. The defendant, 
upon the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, proferred 
a motion to the court for a directed verdict in favor 
of the defendant and against the plaintiff for the 
reason and upon the grounds that the plaintiff had 
failed to prove negligence on the part of the de-
fendant which would entitle plaintiff to judgment. 
The court refused to rule upon said motion but held 
the same in abeyance until the conclusion of the 
evidence to be offered by the defendant. The de-
fendant then presented its evidence and rested. The 
court instructed the jury, and the jury upon delibera-
tion returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant in the sum of $7,000.00. Subse-
quent thereto, the defendant made a Motion for 
Judgment Nothwithstanding the Verdict in favor of 
defendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
The motion was argued and the District Court judge 
denied the motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant herein seeeks reversal of the 
lower court judgment by the jury, and the lower 
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court judgment refusing to grant defendant's Motion 
for a Directed Verdict, and further for refusal to grant 
defendant's Motion fer Judgment in Favor of the 
Defendant Nothwithstanding the Jury Verdict and 
that this court grant a new trial to the defendant, or 
in the alternative that this court adjudicate, on the 
basis of the evidence submitted, that there was no 
negligence on the part of the defendant or its em-
ployees, which was a proximate cause or even a 
contributing cause b the damage to plaintiff's air-
craft, and that judgment be made in favor of de-
fendant and against plaintiff, no cause of action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 3rd, 1963, Mr. R. Al McDonald, a mem-
ber of the Clack-Nomah Flying Club, of Portland, 
Oregon, was flying a four place Mooney light air-
craft from Rock Springs, Wyoming, towards Salt 
Lake City, on his way to Boise, Idaho. Mr. McDonald 
landed at Salt Lake City because of deteriorating 
weather along his proposed flight route. Upon land-
ing the Mooney aircraft Mr. McDonald taxied the 
same to the defendant's installation at the Salt Lake 
Municipal Airport. Mr. McDonald and three other 
people, who were passengers in the aircraft, de-
parted the aircraft .::i.nd went into the defendant's 
terminal. According to the testimony of Mr. Mc-
Donald when asked what he did when he taxied up 
to the defendant's terminal he stated: 
"Parked the aircraft, heading into the prevail-
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ing winds, which were from the West. I locked the 
brakes, gave instrucHons to the gas boy, left the 
plane unlocked ... (Question by counsel) ... I told 
him that I would probably be there for a day be-
cause of the deterioL1tlng weather. I told him which 
octane gas to put in, what level of oil to bring it up 
to and to watch the airplane and take care of it, I 
would leave it unlocked in case he had to move it, 
and that was it." (Transcript of Trial, Page 3, Lines 17 
to 28) 
An employee of the defendant, Mr. Parry, then 
drove Mr. McDonald's party over to the old terminal 
building for 1 unch. The aircraft was taken care of by 
an employee of the def:endant and was tied down by 
said employee; subsequently and at approximately 
3:05 PM, without warning as to probable or possible 
velocity, a wind commenced of approximately 95 
miles per hour with gusts which were approximate-
1 y 25 miles an hour in excess of hurricane velocity 
which is approximately 70 miles per hour. The air· 
craft of the plaintiff began to move around, and al· 
though an employee of defendant attempted to hang 
on to said aircraft, and was in fact attempting to hold 
said aircraft down by grasping the tail section there-
of, he was unable to do so, and the aircraft flipped 
over on its back causing the damage herein sued 
upon. It might be well to note here that a Mooney 
aircraft of this type nnd model is one of the few, if 
not the only aircraft, which is tied down by three 
chains from the surfa.ce, one end of each chain be· 
ing secured to the surface or ground and the other 
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end of the one chain being secured to the tail as-
sembly of said aircraft, and the other two being 
~;ecured to the wheels or landing carriage of the 
aircraft, rather than ~he latter two being secured to 
the wings as is common with almost every other 
light aircraft manufactured. Testimony of Leon Parry, 
former employee of defendant, as to this fact is as 
follows: 
Q Are you generally familiar with the tie-down 
apparatus on Mooneys? 
A This I am. 
Q Will you state what they are? 
A Well, on a Mooney you don't have any tie-down 
rings in the wings at all. On this particular model 
of Mooney there is no tie-down rings in the wings so 
what you do is - the gear is hinged, the shock 
absorption or whatever you want to call it on the 
gear is such a manner that there is a hollow tube 
that runs the complete width of the gear and through 
this hollow tube is where we insert the chain and 
bring the chain back around and loop it through 
itself and put an S Hook on it. 
A The tail tie-down has got a ring, a bar tie-down 
chain. This is the only ring that is on the aircraft. 
Q But no tie-down on the wings? 
A No tie-down on the wings. 
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(Transcript of Testimony, Page 35, Lines 7 to 19 and 
Lines 27 to 30) This was testimony by the witness 
called by plaintiff. This is mentioned merely to poin! 
out that the holding ability of the anchor chains is 
obviously far less so far as holding said airplane 
rigid in a high wind than it would be if the two chains 
were attached to the left and right wings, approxi-
mately half way between the fuselage and the end o! 
the wing. Based upon these facts and a question as to 
whether or not there were S hooks on the ends o! 
the chains with which and by which the chains were 
secured after the aircraft was tied down, the jury 
found for the plaintiff and against the defendant tha! 
the defendant was negligent in relation to said air-
craft. and from this decision and the judgments of 
the court as to the Motion for Directed Verdict and 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict the 
defendant appeals. 
The basis upon which the finding of negligence 
was made, and the motions of the defendant were 
denied, are based upon the testimony basically of 
McDonald, the pilot of the aircraft and a member of 
the Clack-Nomah Flying Club which owned the 
plane. Let it be known that McDonald, nor any of 
his party, observed the Mooney aircraft from the 
time they left the Sterling Aircraft Installation (at 
which time the Mooney aircraft was not yet tied 
down) until they returned after (bold face ours) the 
accident and after the aircraft was flipped over on its 
back. (Transcript of Trial, Page 3, Lines 17 to 30; 
Page 4, Lines 1 to 26; Page 49, Lines 22 to 25). The 
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testimony in its entirety is as follows: 
Counsel for plaintiff is questioning McDonald 
as follows and McDonald is answering. 
0 Now did you find any broken chains about any 
of the landing gear? 
A Yes, the right wing gear had a broken chain on 
it. The other chains were not broken. 
Q And was the chJin still wrapped around the 
landing gear or had it pulled off? 
A No, the right gea~ still had the chain wrapped 
around it. It was merely looped around the gear. 
(Transcript of Trial, Pc.ge 6, Lines 1 to 8) 
Plaintiff here testifies unequivocally that the 
right wing gear chain had broken. These chains, as 
a matter of fact, were put in place on the surface 
approximately one month prior to this incident and 
such chains were of the type and size that are com-
monly used and recommended for use as tie down 
chains and were nearly new. They had been put 
on new, according to the testimony of Sterling 
Meyer, who was at ~he time of said accident presi-
dent of Sterling Aircraft, the defendant. He testified 
that the tie-down facilities were installed under his 
supervision by the CJty of Salt Lake, and that the 
chains themselves were put in by the company ap-
proximately three weeks to a month prior to this 
incident, and that they were half inch chains, new, 
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and were those commonly used for the mooring of 
aircraft. (Transcript of Trial, Page 76, Lines 1 to 30) 
Further questioning of Mr. McDonald was as 
follows: 
MR. FAUST: I just have one more question. 
Q (By Mr. Faust) You have examined these chains? 
A Yes. 
Q Will you explain to the Court and the jury how 
the end of the chain was, that is to say if there were 
a padlock, a bolt, a snap, a bolt or any kind of thing 
like that? 
A On each chain there was nothing. The chain 
just had the last loop and that was the end of it. 
There was no S fastening device of any kind. 
MR. FAUST: That's all. 
(Transcript of Trial, Page 46, Lines 21-30) 
Mr. McDonald further testified that subsequent 
to the incident that there was no S hook on the end 
of one of the chains. (Transcript of Trial, Page 50, 
Lines 27 & 28, Page 51, Lines 1 & 2). However, the 
witness did testify also that the airplane obviously 
must have been tied down because there was a 
broken chain (bold face ours) on the aircraft. The wit· 
ness McDonald testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, tell us what you meant 
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then, Mr. McDonald. 
THE WITNESS: Well, the airplane was obvious-
ly tied down because there was a broken chain on 
the aircraft. 
THE COURT: I didn't hear you. 
THE WITNESS: The plane was obviously tied 
down on the one gear at least because there was a 
broken chain there when I got back and the fact 
there was gas all around it and they gave me a bill 
for it also. (Transcript of Trial, Page 50, Lines 3-11) 
Further McDonald testified in answer to a question 
by plaintiff's attorney that: 
"The tail chain was laying there intact. The left 
wing chain was laying intact. The right wing chain 
was broken." (bold iace ours) (Transcript of Trial, 
page 44, Lines 21 & 22) While he refers to "wing" 
chains descriptively, :he chains were attached to the 
landing gear as hereinbefore described. 
Mr. Leon Parry, while testifying as a witness 
for the plaintiff, stated that he inspected the airplane 
and at the time he inspected it, it did have chain at-
tachments to the main gear meaning the two wheels 
and to th tail. (Transcript of Trial, Page 36, Lines 17 
to 24, and Page 37, Lines 6 to 11) 
Mr. Parry also testified, as a witness called by 
the plaintiff, concerning the tying down of the air-
craft as follows: 
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TFlE COURT: Can you tell the jury how it was 
tied down from what you saw? 
THE WITNESS: Well, all the tie-down chains 
was where they should have been. Now as far as 
the knotting apparatus or something like this, I 
couldn't say definite1y but they was on the tie-down 
rings or the landing gear. Now this is prior, prior to 
the peak gusts or when the wind started blowing. 
THE COURT: Prior to the time that the left side 
collapsed? 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
THE COURT: -\Vas there anything about the 
tie-downs or the manner that you observed that was 
not in the usual way of tying a plane under such 
circumstances? 
THE WITNESS: No, definitely not. If there had 
of been I would have changed it. 
THE COURT: I take it then from what you say 
that from your obseP1ation that the tie-downs were 
as they should have been? 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
(Transcript of Trial, P::lqe 42, Lines 1 to 21) 
Mr. Parry further :estified as follows: 
THE COURT: Well, from what examination 
you have made however can you assure this jury 
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as to what was done? 
THE WITNESS: As far as tying it down this 
way I can't. This is the way it is supposed to be done 
and this is the way ail the line boys done it but as 
far as my own testimony and saying that I inspected 
it and got down there and checked it and made sure, 
I can't, because I didn't - it was just a running 
glance. 
THE COURT: But from the examination you 
made of this airplane what is your best judgment as 
to how it was tied down at all three points? 
THE WITNESS: Knowing the person that had 
worked the shift before me I would say definitely 
that it was tied down properly. 
MR. FAUST: I object to that answer and ask 
that it be stricken. 
THE COURT: Well, I think maybe that is cor-
rect. You would have to base it, Mr. Parry, upon 
what you observed as to the chains you saw there, 
did you not? 
THE WITNESS: Right. 
THE COURT: And from the observation that 
you did make what is your best opinion as to how 
all three points were fastened? 
THE WITNESS: They would definitely be 
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fastened properly or I am pretty sure I would have 
changed them. I am positive I would have changed 
them. (Transcript of Trial, Pages 55, Lines 9-30, and 
Page 56, Lines 1-5) Also he testified as follows con-
cerning the S hooks: 
THE COURT: As I understand you know that 
there were S hooks on these three chains? 
THE WITNESS: There was definitely Shooks 
on the chains. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: This is positive because we 
don't install the chains. See, this row of tie-down 
chains was stuck in just prior to this Mooney coming 
in and we wouldn't hdve stuck the chains in withoul 
S hooks. 
MR. FAUST: Now if the S were hooked ii 
would be secured? 
THE WITNESS: This is true but it is possible 
with the aircraft jumping around, vibrating around, 
it could have jumped out. (Transcript of Trial, Page 
56, Lines 25-30, Page 57, Lines 1-8) 
Mr. Herb Smith was called as a witness subse-
quently by the defendant who stated that he was at 
the Sterling Aircraft, Inc., installation at the time o! 
this incident and further testified that he saw the 
three chains on the Mooney aircraft prior to the ac-
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cident, and that there was a chain on each main strut 
(landing gear) and one on the tail, all of which were 
securely anchored in the ground on the other end, 
according to regulations of the Salt Lake City Airport. 
He further testified concerning the S hooks on the 
chains, as follows: 
Q On this particular iine of tie-down chains where 
the Mooney aircraft was parked, do you recall hav-
ing seen S hooks in the end of the chains? 
A Yes sir. 
THE COURT: In reference to this plane? 
MR. GARNER: I am coming to that plane. 
Q (By Mr. Garner) Now with respect to the tie-
downs of this airplane did you observe S hooks 
in the end of those chains? 
A Yes, there is S hooks on them. 
Q In all three chains? 
A All three chains. 
Q The chain that aff:xed the tail? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q The chain that affixed the left main gear? 
A Yes, sir. 
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Q The chain that affixed the right main gear? 
A Yes, sir. 
(Transcript of Trial, Page 62, Lines 24-30, Page 63, 
Lines 1-11) 
Mr. Herb Smith, witness for the defendant, fur-
ther stated that he observed Mr. Parry as he went 
out of the door of the defendant Sterling Aircraft, 
Inc., waiting room at the time the wind came up, 
and that either the nose gear or the left landing gear 
(he didn't recall which one) started folding when he 
(Parry) went out of the door, and that is where the 
oscillation of the airplane came from, and at that 
time it started to move. (Transscript of Trial, Page 
68, Lines 21 to 30, and Page 69, Lines 1 to 12.) 
Mr. Sterling Meyer, called as a witness for the 
defendant, testified that at the time of this incident 
on June 3, 1963, that he was the president and gen-
eral managr of defendant, Sterling Aircraft Inc., that 
he personally supervised the putting in of the iron 
rods into the cement, and he personally supervised 
the pla.cing of the chains connected thereto, and that 
the chains were approximately a one half inch chain/ 
which is commonly used for the mooring of aircraft. 
(Transcript of Trial, Page 7, Lines 1-30) Mr. Meyer 
further testified as to wind damage observed by him 
at the airport, and stated upon direct examination 
that the wind had blown the plate glass window out 
ih the office of defendant, Sterling Aircraft Inc., that 
it had blown out approximately 50 panes in the 
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upper skylight portion of said building and that it 
blew out several (he did not know how many) win-
dows in the office section; that further he observed 
that the wind had blown down a hanger, which had 
five airplanes in it. Th.'l~ it was, in his words, complete-
ly and totally torn down, and that there would be 
about sixteen other hangers that were damaged, and 
some aircraft. 
It was further testified to by one of the witnesses 
that upon examining the retraction gear in the air-
craft, which raises and lowers the landing gear, that 
the same was not lccked, although Mr. McDonald 
testified that he did in fact lock the gear, and there 
was some conjectural testimony as reported in the 
transcript as to whether or not such an aircraft could 
be landed or taxied without the retraction gear 
locked, which I think is of no consequence as to 
whether it could be or was unlocked at the time of 
this incident. Mr. Perry, as a witness called by the 
Plaintiff, testified concerning the happenings to the 
landing gear itself at the time of the windstorm and 
stated that when he directed his attention to the air-
craft, the left gear coJ.lapsed and folded up into the 
wing, and the nose gear collapsed immediately 
thereafter throwing the tail of the aircraft upward, 
and by reason of the gear collapse and the intense 
wind it allowed the tail to go so high in the air that 
the only way Mr. Parry could reach it was with his 
fingers in the tie-dov'rn ring, and he simply could 
not hold it. (Transscript of Trial, Page 39, Lines 21-30, 
Page 40, Lines 1-30, Page 41, Lines 1-9) 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE 
PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFF UPON WHICH 
THE JURY COULD CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY 
BASE A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND 
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT. THE PLAINTIFF 
FAILED TO PROVE ANY NEGLIGENCE WHATSQ. 
EVER ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
THEREFORE THE VERDICT WAS IMPROPER. 
It is the position of the defendant that negligence 
is never presumed, and the burden is upon the 
plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evi· 
dence the alleged act or acts of negligence claimed 
by the plaintiff before a jury is justified in making a 
finding that the defendant was negligent. (Industrial 
Commission vs. Wasatch Grading Company, 80 
Utah 223, 14P (2nd) 988 and also 38 Am. Jur., Section 
285, Pages 973 & 974, and cases cited therein) There 
was no proof of negligence and certainly no pre-
ponderance of evidence of negligence on the part 
of the defendant. Th8 only reference to any possi-
bility thereof was the testimony of McDonald, a mem· 
ber of the Clack-Nomah flying Club, which owned 
the Mooney aircraft, and the pilot thereof, that after 
the accident and after the plane was overturned and 
after the severe wind had ceased, that two of the 
three chains that wore used to secure the aircraft 
were intact and lyinq on the ground, and that the 
third chain was brolcen. The most this would infer 
would be the tremendous force that was obviously 
placed upon at least one of the chains by reason of 
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the violent w i n d storm. These were half inch 
chains secured according to Salt Lake Municipal Air-
port Regulations, and were the size and type of 
chains used in the industry for the securing and 
mooring of light aircraft. McDonald further testified 
that subsequent to the accident he did not see any 
S hooks on the ends of the chains. There is 
conflicting t e st i mo n y as to this but were there 
not, there is no showing of any evidence nor any 
proof that the presence or lack 0£ S hooks on the 
ends of the chain was in fact or could be construed 
as negligence on the part of the defendant. It was 
testified with no coni.::-adiction that the Mooney air-
craft was in fact moored to the surface by three 
chains which were attached to the aircraft, one on 
the right strut, one on the left strut, and one on the 
tail. Herb Smith testified that he observed the air-
craft, that all three chains were tied and were taut. 
The plaintiff herein through McDonald, testifying for 
th0 plaintiff, did not see the airplane tied down prior 
to the wind and the incident complained of, but only 
after when the aircraft was in fact turned over, so 
he could have no knowledge or information as to 
whether it was properly tied down or whether it was 
not. We submit that the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor 
does not apply in this case, and that it is the obliga-
tion of the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that the aircraft was not properly tied 
down. We submit to the court that the jury nor the 
court can properly assume (bold face ours) that it 
was not tied down properly and particularly in the 
light of the fact that a wind 25 miles an hour in excess 
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(bold face ours) of the propensities of a hurricane, 
according to weather bureau definition (70 miles per 
hour), was present, ond did in fact do tremendous 
damage to the airport and to installations therein. 
Plaintiff herein is attempting to "pull himself up by 
his own bootstraps." We agree with the case of 
Wyatt vs. Baughman, 239 P. 2d 193, a Utah case, that 
the presumption of negligence can be raised but sub-
mit that the case clearly sets out that it can only be 
raised upon evidence being introduced to raise such 
a presumption. (Wya~t vs. Baughman, 239 P. 2d 193) 
We submit that the court's instruction No. 7 is 
correct and proper and that the jury in spite of the 
instruction ignored the same in arriving at their 
verdict. Instruction 7 is as follows: 
"You are instructed that the fact that the plaintiff's 
airplane or other personal property was damaged 
at the defendant's airport is not in and of itself evi-
dence that the defendant was negligent. You are in-
structed that negligence is never presumed and that 
the burden remains upon the plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence the alleged act of 
negligence claimed by the plaintiff before you are 
warranted in making a finding that a defendant is 
negligent." 
The jury had to assume that by reason of the 
fact that the airplane did in fact turn over that it by 
necessity was not properly tied down and secured. 
This we submit is entirely without merit. McDonald, 
acting for the plaintitf, did not see the aircraft from 
the time he left it to b3 gassed at the defendant's in-
stallation prior to the time it had been tied down (he 
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had left before it was tied down), until he returned 
after the accident had taken place. The testimony is 
uncontroverted that tha aircraft was secured by more 
than one witness who testified that there were three 
chains tied to the aircraft and that they were taut. 
The court's attention ls further called to the fact that 
there is testimony that the landing retraction gear 
was not in fact lock~d, and that as Leon Parry, em-
ployee of the defendant, ran toward the aircraft that 
one of the landing gear, and the nose wheel col-
lapsed, which caused the plane to oscillate and 
move around, and eventually, because of the vio-
lence of the 95 mile per hour gusts and the violent 
motion of the aircraft brought about by the wind and 
the collapse of the gedr, the tail chain let go, and the 
aircraft flipped over on its back. Mr. Parry hung on to 
the aircraft at the tail section as the same was vibrat-
ing and bouncing up and down, and in fact held on 
until such time as he could no longer control or 
maintain his position, and was threatened with 
bodily harm at which time the aircraft did in fact 
flip over. We submit that there is no negligence 
whatsoever on the part of the plaintiff, and that the 
jury directly ignored the instruction of the court, 
No. 7. It was clear from the testimony that there are 
any number of ways to secure an aircraft, and any 
number of ways to tie or make fast the chains (or in 
many cases ropes) that are used for tying down light 
aircraft. It was further testified that in the event of a 
tremendous amount of motion up and down or side-
ways of the aircraft, under certain conditions that it 
could in fact loosen any chain that was made secure, 
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whether it was secured by an Shook, a pin spring, 
a C hook or knotted. For the defendant to have 
been negligent would have required the failure to 
do what a reasonable prudent person would have 
done under the circumstances of the situation or do-
ing what such person under such existing circum-
stances would not have done. We further submit 
that no action or lack of action on the part of the de-
fendant was the proximate cause of the accident; 
that in order to be such proximate cause must be that 
cause which in a natural, continuous sequence un-
broken by any new cause, produced the injury with-
out which the injury would not have occured. Such 
is not the case here and again the jury ignored the 
instruction of the cour~, which Instruction No. 3 clear-
ly set out the above ta the jury. We submit that the 
testimony is uncontroverted, that the aircraft was 
securely tied down, ·lhat a wind with gusts of some 
95 miles per hour struck the airport suddenly and 
with less than a two minute warning, and came up 
within that time from an ordinary breeze, and fur-
ther that the retraction gear of the Mooney aircraft 
was not in fact locked as it should have been, and 
that the defendant did all that a reasonable 
and prudent person or company person n e 1 
should or could do under the circumstances, and 
further that there is no testimony whatsoever in 
the plaintiff's case to prove negligence, certainly not 
proximate cause, and that by reason thereof and 
basd upon the instructions given by the court, that 
the jury improperly returned a verdict for plaintiff 
and against the defendant. Although the law is 
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voluminous and clear on these subjects, defendant 
+eels obligated to call the court's attention to authori-
ties on Point I, II, & 111 and presents the same here 
to cover all points inc.ismuch as the law and fact are 
rneshed together covering each Point. 
It is properly stated that perfection of conduct 
is humanly impossible and the law does not exact 
an unreasonable amou.nt of care from anyone. The 
degree of diligence one must observe in the per-
formance of his common law duty to use care to 
prevent injury to others is ordinary care or reason-
able care. Both ordinary care and reasonable care 
mean due care, tha+ is, care according to the cir-
cumstances of the c:i.se. (38 Am. Jur. Section 29; 
Stedman Vs. O'Neil, 72 A, 923, 22 LRA (NS) 1229) The 
standard by which the conduct of a person in a par-
ticular situation is judged in determining whether 
he is negligent is the care which an ordinary prudent 
person would exercise under like circumstances. 
Negligence is the omission to do something that a 
reasonable man, guided by those considerations 
which would ordinarJly regulate the conduct of hu-
man affairs, would do, or the doing of something 
which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. 
(38 Am. Jur. Section 30; Heller vs. New York, N. H. 
& H. R. Co., CCA 2nd, 265 F 192, 17 ALR 823 and 
others following). Defendant submits that it did ev-
erything that a normal, reasonable, prudent man 
would do under the circumstances, and in the 
ordinary course of business and in this case did more 
than that in that the employees thereof, after having 
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properly tied down Sc.id aircraft did upon discovering 
that a wind was coming of any force whatsoever im-
mediately checked lhis aircraft, and other aircraft 
to see that they were tied down, and did in fact exert 
far beyond a reasonable amount of effort to prevent 
damage to the aircraft in question. There is no proof 
whatsoever, and was not at the conclusion of plain-
tiff's case, or at the conclusion of the lawsuit itself 
any evidence presented that the aircraft was not 
properly tied down, and moored, but in fact there 
was testimony by two witnesses that it was indeed 
properly tied down. Plaintiff's only evidence as to 
negligence of the defendant is that the fact that the 
aircraft was blown over during a 95 mile per hour 
wind and such is evidence and proof that it had 
not been properly tied down. To find the judgment 
in favor of plaintiff under these circumstances is con-
trary to the law and the rules of evidence in that the 
plaintiff must prove the acts or omissions on the part 
of the defendant which would constitute negligence 
and be the proximate cause of the damage. Plaintiff 
cannot merely profer that the plane was damaged, 
therefore the defendant had to be negligent. 
The question of the defendant's liability law-
fully can be withdrawn from the jury and de-
termined by the court, as a matter of law when 
the facts are indisputable, being s t i p u 1 a t e d, 
found by the court or jury, established by evidence 
that is free from conflict and raise an inference which 
is so certain that all reasonable men in the exercise 
of a fair and impartial judgment must agree upon, 
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a.nd draw the same conclusion. (Lowe vs. Salt Lake 
City, 13 Utah 91. 44 P 1050) This we agree is an older 
case, but submit that the law has not changed, that 
when the facts as presented by the plaintiff are 
taken at their best and reasonable minds would 
agree that there is no negligence on the part of the 
defendant, then the court should, as a matter of law, 
so find and so inform the jury by a preemptory in-
struction. (38 Am. Jur., Section 345, Austin vs. Public 
Service Co., 299 Illinois 112, 132 NE 458) 
A nonsuit is proper in an action for negligence 
when an inference of contributory negligence on the 
part of the plaintiff or the absence of neqliqence on 
the part of the defendant (bold face ours) is deducible 
from the undisputed facts and circumstances proved. 
(Hausman vs. Madison, 85 Wisconsin 187 55 NW 
167) We submit that taking the plaintiff's evidence 
in its entirety and asi::uming it to be uncontroverted, 
the plaintiff sets out that he left his aircraft at the in-
stallation of the defendant, that he left the installation 
prior to the time the aircraft was tied down, that when 
he returned that the aircraft had been flipped over on 
its back by the wind, and that the aircraft had been 
damaged; that two of the anchor chains were lying 
on the ground, and part of the third anchor chain was 
secured to the right landing gear, the chain having 
been broken and the remaining portion of the chain 
anchored to the ground. This is the sum and sub-
stance and total of plaintiff's case against the de-
fendant upon which he claims negligence on the 
part of the defendant for recovery for damages. He 
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further states that there were no S hooks visible 
to him on the other end of the chains as distin-
guished from that end anchored and moored to the 
ground, and claims that by reason of there not being 
S hooks on the end;-, that the defendant must be 
negligent. Such is not the case. S hooks are not 
required by law, or a field regulation, to be attached 
as a mode of securinq a chain to itself after having 
been attached to an aircraft. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT MADE AT THE CONCLUSION OF PLAIN-
TIFF'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE. 
At the conclusion of the evidence as presented 
by the plaintiff, the plaintiff had proved nothing 
further than that Al McDonald had flown his air-
craft into Salt Lake City, because of deteriorating 
weather; that he had parked the aircraft at Sterling 
Aircraft, Inc., and had instructed the gas boy to gas 
the aircraft and check the oil. Prior to the time that 
the aircraft was tied down, Mr. McDonald and his 
party left, and did not return until the accident had 
happened. His testimony, prior to the plaintiff 
resting, was that the aircraft when he ob served 
it, was on its back, that two of the chains were 
off, one was still partially on the landing gear but had 
broken the chain, and that he had observed the tie 
chains, and testified that there were no S hooks 
on the ends thereof. This is the sum and substance 
of the testimony submitted to the court by Al Mc-
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Donald on behalf of the plaintiff, and it is respectfully 
suhmitted that based upon this, that the trial court 
cummitted error in not at that time granting the mo-
tion of the defendant which was then made request-
ing a Directed V erd.ict based upon the fact and 
grounds that the plaintiff had failed to prove the 
omission or the commission of any act constituting 
negligence on the part of the defendant. While it is 
discretionary with the court to take under advise-
ment a Motion for a Directed Verdict, and hold the 
same in abeyance until defendant has submitted his 
case in chief, we submit that to do so by the court 
in this case was error, and as a practical matter that 
to refrain from passing judgment on a Motion for a 
Directed Verdict after plaintiff's case and until after 
the defendant's case has been prsented, does not 
render justice to the parties. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
OF DEFENDANT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT. 
It is respectfully submitted that the court's error 
in denying the defendant's Motion for Judgment Not-
withstanding the Verdict and in favor of the de-
fendant is based upon precisely the same points as 
herein immediately set out above in Point I and in 
Point II. The trial court should have ruled in favor 
of defendant's Motion for Judgment in Favor of De-
fendant Notwithstanding the Verdict for the reasons 
and upon the grounds set out in the argument of 
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defendant, Points I cmd II, and defendant believes 
that to elucidate further on Point III would be repeti-
tious. However, def·'3ndant would make one final 
statement. While it is true that the jury is the trier oi 
the facts, and has the right and power to believe one 
witness against many or many against one, and to 
ascertain what they ~elieve to be the truth as to the 
facts of any given situation, we believe that it is the 
prerogative, yea, the absolute legal duty of the trial 
judge in his capacity as such to, when the situation 
is legally apparent, correct the possibility and prob-
ability of injustice and to enforce the rules of evi· 
dence and the rules of proof as propagated by the 
statutes and the decisions of this Supreme Court, and 
the trial court should exercise that restraining or con· 
straining influence which the history of juris· 
prudence has made abundantly clear as being 
necessary upon juries and the jury system; such 
juries while being triers of the facts are neverthe-
less subject to the laws governing the trial of ac· 
tions. The failure to do so on the part of the trial judg.3 
is error, if not in law, then in fact. 
Respectfully submitted 
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